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Biologics are medical products made from a natural source, for instance:
 Proteins, cells, allergenics
 Blood components or derivatives




































Biologics represent an increasing share of blockbuster drugs worldwide:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2016
1 LIPITOR LIPITOR LIPITOR SERETIDE HUMIRA HUMIRA HUMIRA
2 SERETIDE SERETIDE SERETIDE LIPITOR SERETIDE SERETIDE HARVONI
3 PLAVIX PLAVIX HUMIRA HUMIRA HERCEPTIN ENBREL ENBREL
4 HERCEPTIN ENBREL ENBREL ENBREL ENBREL HERCEPTIN MABTHERA
5 ENBREL HERCEPTIN HERCEPTIN HERCEPTIN LIPITOR MABTHERA REMICADE
6 ZYPREXA HUMIRA LOVENOX LOVENOX MABTHERA REMICADE REVLIMID
7 LOVENOX LOVENOX AVASTIN MABTHERA LOVENOX LOVENOX AVASTIN
8 GLIVEC GLIVEC MABTHERA AVASTIN REMICADE AVASTIN HERCEPTIN
9 PANTOZOL ZYPREXA GLIVEC REMICADE AVASTIN LUCENTIS LANTUS
10 SYMBICORT MABTHERA ZYPREXA GLIVEC SPIRIVA LYRICA PREVNAR
Source: International Bar Association
BIOLOGICS SMALL MOLECULES
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 A biosimilar is a biological medicine highly similar to another already approved 
biological medicine (the “reference medicine”) 
 Biosimilars are approved according to the same standards of pharmaceutical quality, 
safety and efficacy that apply to all biological medicines:
 Comprehensive comparability studies and solid pharmaceutical quality data
 Biosimilar can rely on efficacy and safety experience of reference product
 Extrapolation of other indications is possible if scientific evidence addresses all 
specific aspects of these indications
 A biosimilar is not regarded as a generic of a biological medicine, primarily because the 
natural variability and more complex manufacturing of biological medicines do not allow 
an exact replication at the molecular level
Biosimilars vs Generics
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“A biosimilar is a biological medicinal product that contains a version of the active substance 
of an already authorised original biological medicinal product.  Similarity to the reference 
medicinal product in terms of quality characteristics, biological activity, safety and efficacy 
based on a comprehensive comparability exercise needs to be established.” 




Small molecule Large, complex molecule
Simple manufacturing process:
• Structure can be readily recreated from 
examining reference product
• Process can be changed substantially 
while preserving end result
Complex manufacturing process:
• Manufacturing process is integral to 
success of end product
• Minor changes in production can 
dramatically alter function
Straightforward development:
• Limited scientific know-how required
• Limited clinical tests 
• High success rate 
Complex development:
• Extensive R&D required
• More extensive clinical trials required
• Lower success rate 
Low cost to bring to market
(€2-3 million)
High cost to bring to market
(€100-200 million)
Like generics, biosimilar entry has a pro-competitive effect that generally results in benefits 
for payors, national health budgets and patients 
But, because biosimilars are not generics:
 They face higher entry barriers (both cost and time)
 Manufacturers will require a significant ROI to enter the market
 Therefore a minor reduction in a biosimilars’ ability to penetrate the market and recoup 










Encourages R&D into 
new “biobetters”
Strategies to Delay Biosimilar 
Entry and Uptake
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In the context of generic entry, the Court of Justice has already made clear that late lifecycle 
strategies are allowable, provided they represent competition on the merits:
Originators of biological products have the same incentives as small molecule originators to 
delay the entry of new competitors:
 Price erosion occurs quickly once a biosimilar enters the market, so any delay will have a 
substantial effect on profit margins
Originator Strategies to Delay Biosimilar Entry
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“[…] the preparation by an undertaking, even in a dominant position, of a strategy whose object it is to minimise
the erosion of its sales and to enable it to deal with competition from generic products is legitimate and is part of 
the normal competitive process, provided that the conduct envisaged does not depart from practices coming 
within the scope of competition on the merits, which is such as to benefit consumers.”  
Case C-457/10, Astra Zeneca
Delaying biosimilar entry may be easier than delaying generic entry:
 Fewer companies have the sophistication to produce biosimilars, so there 
may be one or very few competitors entering the market at the time of patent 
expiry 
 Biosimilars are not identical to their reference product, and their 
authorization is more complex, which presents more opportunities to 
interfere with their entry on the market
 Biosimilars are newer products, and therefore HCPs may be less familiar 
and more risk averse with respect to their use, which provides opportunities 
to discourage HCPs from switching from the reference product 
Originator Strategies to Delay Biosimilar Entry
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LESS LIKELY MORE LIKELY
• Reverse patent settlements
• “Product hopping” 
• IP/Regulatory Abuse
• Product denigration
In the context of generics, competition authorities have already found that it is abusive to:
 Make false or misleading representations during regulatory/IP process
 Intervene in the authorization process of a generic without a good-faith basis to hinder 
generic entry




• When registering its SPC for Losec in national patent offices, 
AstraZeneca listed the date Losec first entered the EU market rather 
than the date it was granted an MA
• By intentionally misleading patent authorities AstraZeneca obtained longer patent protection 
for Losec against generic entrants
• European Commission fine: €60 million  
AstraZeneca used the later date knowing the regulatory authorities would 
assume the date referred to its MA approval rather than its market entry, 
and did not explain that it was using a different date




• Ratiopharm’s generic fentanyl patch had received approval through a 
centralized process following a lengthy EMA investigation
• Although the French authority was required to approve the generic, 
Janssen made numerous interventions citing safety concerns 
• By intervening in the French MA process and circumventing the European framework, 
Janssen-Cilag was able to delay recognition of Ratiopharm’s generic by a year  
• European Commission fine: €25 million  
Janssen-Cilag raised its safety concerns regarding differences between the generic 
(dosage, patch size) even though these issues had already been addressed at the 
European level 
Abuse of the IP and Regulatory System
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Biosimilars face a higher risk of such kinds of regulatory abuse:
 Questions of IP, market authorizations for biosimilars are highly complex
 While the MA process is centralized, automatic substitutability is left to the national level
The issue of whether a biosimilar may be used for additional indications is not as straightforward 
as with generics
 Requires a complex assessment (extrapolation)
 This involves a multifaceted analysis: 
Bottom line: there are so many factors involved that a an originator company could easily raise 
doubts at national or EU level to delay the entry of generics
Abuse of the IP and Regulatory System
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“If biosimilarity has been demonstrated in one indication, extrapolation to the other indications of the reference 
product could be acceptable with appropriate scientific justification.”  
EMA Guidelines on similar biological medical products 
Mechanism of 
Action





Abuse of the IP and Regulatory System
EXAMPLES
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Originator biologic takes improper steps to extend its market exclusivity, 
for example by:
 Registering for additional patents solely for the purpose of blocking 
entry
 Supplying misleading information to the EMA regarding the scope of 
its patent or RDP rights 
Originator biologic takes improper steps to delay biosimilar entry by 
interfering in national procedure, for example by raising unfounded:
 IP concerns in procedures to allow market access of biosimilars
 Safety concerns in procedures to determine interchangeability, 
switching and substitution between the biosimilar and its reference 
product
Competition authorities have found it is abusive to make false or misleading statements: 
 Suggesting without evidence that there is a problem with the safety or efficacy of generics




(2017) • Generics for Sanofi’s Plavix used a different salt (because Sanofi 
had a patent on the salt) and had one more indication than generics 
• Although true, Sanofi’s statements were misleading
• They implied the generic was inferior without any medical basis
• This might make doctors less likely to prescribe the generic
• French competition authority fine: €40.6 million  
Sanofi told doctors about the different salt without explaining that it was clinically 
irrelevant.  It also held out Plavix as having been time-tested while characterizing 
generics as untested and therefore dangerous
The French Competition Authority noted that certain characteristics of the pharmaceutical 
market heightened the anticompetitive effects of misleading statements about generics:
 HCPs are slow to take up a new product without fully understanding it
 HCPs are extremely risk averse with respect to product safety 
 HCPs do not usually understand the approval process or pharmacology and will therefore 
accept statements about product characteristics at face value
These factors will be even further pronounced in the case of biosimilars:
 HCPs cannot determine autonomously whether a biosimilar is really functionally equivalent 
in all relevant respects to its reference product, and will rely on the MA and representations 
from pharma companies
 There are by definition differences between a biosimilar and a reference product, so there 
may be some leeway for the originating company to mention these distinctions because they 
may not be irrelevant in all circumstances
 There is also considerable margin to mislead on off-label use and extrapolation, as this is a 









Originator biologic makes false or misleading claims about competing biosimilars such as:
“Our product has been the tried and true treatment for this condition for 10 years.” 
“The biosimilar is scientifically different from our original product.” 
“We have clinical studies for the use of our product for this indication, the biosimilar 
is only authorized to treat it by extrapolation.” 
“Do you want to take the risk of using a biosimilar to treat this serious condition?” 
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“While the biosimilar has been authorized at the European level for now, there are 
many doubts about whether they are violating our patents.”  
While possible, reverse payment patent settlements and product hopping are unlikely to be the 
most common forms of abusive action taken by originator companies against biosimilars




Reverse Payment Patent Settlements
 Certain transfers of payments to 
generics in exchange for their agreement 
to delay market violate competition law
 Biosimilar companies invest many 
hundreds of millions of euros to bring a 
biosimilar close to gaining a market 
authorization
 It is less likely that biosimilars would 
have the financial incentives to accept a 
pay-for-delay settlement
Product Hopping
 Forcing a switch from treatments that are 
going generic to next-generation 
regimens that confer little clinical value 
may violate competition law
 Biologics are complex, and minor tweaks 
in manufacturing methods (e.g. from 
capsule to tablet) can have major impact 
on effectiveness
 Research more likely to focus on 
development of “biobetters” with real 
clinical benefit 
